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Abstract 
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OF MIND AND MORAL STATUS 
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Chairperson:  Andrew Monroe 
 
 
	 Mind perception serves as a basis for how people make judgments about the moral 
value of other beings. Perception of a greater capacity for experience (e.g., joy, suffering) in 
another being leads to greater attributions of value (i.e., greater wrongness of harming that 
being). Current research has primarily focused on the concept of “dehumanization,” where 
reducing one’s perception of mind in another being leads to reduced moral valuations of that 
being, opening the door to mistreatment. The present study investigates this mechanism in 
reverse, testing whether having a name serves to enhance perceived mindedness and increase 
moral value. Using pill bugs, we examined this concept by having participants interact with 
either a named (“Ellie”) or an unnamed bug, then rate perceptions of the bug’s mental 
characteristics (e.g., capacity for joy, suffering, etc.). Results showed that participants in the 
named bug condition rated the bug significantly higher on measures of both experiential and 
agentic mindedness. Participants were then told that the bug would be exterminated and were 
given the opportunity to offer an open-ended amount of money in order to save the bug. 
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Contrary to my hypotheses, there was not a significant difference in money amounts between 
groups. These findings provide insight into the way that we perceive other minds and lay the 
foundation additional research questions about the connection between perceptions of 
mindedness and willingness to take action. 
Keywords: Mind perception, morality, naming 
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Naming and Morality: How Having a Name Influences Perceptions of Mind and Moral 
Status 
 Perceiving entities as having a mind is an important basis for judgments about their 
moral status. Perceiving beings as having the capacity for experiencing mental states such as 
fear, pain, or joy is foundational for viewing them as being entitled moral rights, including 
protection from unwarranted harm (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Past research on 
mindedness has largely focused on the act of denying minds to others as a means for 
decreasing their moral value, as in cases of prejudice (Kozak, Wegner, & Marsh, 2006), 
failures to help (Västfäll, Slovic, Mayorga, & Peters, 2014), or extreme acts of harm (e.g., 
genocide). However, little research has investigated techniques for enhancing mind 
perception as a way of increasing moral value. In the present study, we examine one possible 
avenue for increasing perceptions of mindedness: naming. We test the hypothesis that non-
human entities that have an identifiable name will be perceived as having increased 
mindedness and will thereby be ascribed increased moral value, leading to an aversion to 
causing them harm, relative to unnamed non-human entities. 
Mind Perception as a Basis for Moral Judgments  
Mind perception refers to the extent to which we perceive human-like mental 
characteristics in another being. These characteristics are generally grouped into two distinct 
dimensions. The first is agency, whereby beings have the ability to make decisions, plan for 
the future, and act intentionally. The second is experience, characterized by the awareness of 
one’s surroundings as well as the capacity for emotion and feeling (e.g., suffering, hunger, 
pleasure, etc.). Importantly, these different mental capacities imbue entities with different 
responsibilities and rights (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Waytz et al., 2010). Specifically, 
NAMING AND MORALITY
  
	
	
2	
the capacity for agency makes an entity morally responsible for its good and bad actions. 
That is, to the extent an entity can make plans or act intentionally, society and individuals 
hold it accountable for its behavior. Contrastingly, the capacity for experience imbues an 
entity with moral rights, and unjustly causing it harm is viewed as immoral (Gray et al., 
2007). For example, people are not generally angered by a person kicking a tree because the 
tree lacks the capacity for feeling pain; however, kicking a puppy is easily recognized as 
wrong because the puppy has the mental capacity for pain and suffering.  
Some researchers have argued that mind perception underlies and motivates all moral 
judgment. The theory of dyadic morality asserts that all moral judgments inherently involve a 
responsible moral agent and an affected moral patient (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). While 
this argument does not explain moral judgments about acts that have no discernible victims 
or that do not involve suffering (e.g., taboo sexual acts or harming the environment; Monroe, 
Guglielmo, & Malle, 2012), it is clear that where minds are perceived as being capable of 
suffering, it is generally considered immoral to cause them harm unnecessarily. 
This conclusion is especially relevant when reasoning about the moral treatment of 
animals. Whereas adult humans have highly developed faculties for both experience and 
agency (Waytz et al., 2010)—and therefore are subject to moral rules and entitled to moral 
protections—animals are viewed as having reduced moral standing. People tend to think of 
animals as having more basic capabilities in each of these domains: not only are they less 
able to act decisively and plan for the future, but they are also viewed as less capable of 
experiencing certain emotions or phenomena (e.g., pain). This reduction is somewhat muted 
for animals commonly kept as pets (e.g., dogs; Gray et al., 2007), but the tendency to 
perceive animals as lacking agentic and experiential minds is particularly acute for animals 
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used as food (e.g., the “meat paradox,” Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010). This perceived 
lack of mindedness might allow or even motivate worse moral treatment.  
Dehumanization  
Even in humans, however, mind perception is not always static; types of messaging 
(e.g., comparing immigrants to “vermin” or an “infecting virus”) can reduce perceptions of 
others having a mind (Marshall & Shapiro, 2018). The act of denying mindedness to others is 
typically referred to as dehumanization, which operates by reducing the perceived mental 
characteristics of the target being and serves to reduce the target’s moral value (Haslam, 
2006). Like mind perception, dehumanization tends to influence perception of either agency 
or experience. Denial of agentic mental qualities is referred to as animalistic dehumanization, 
characterized by perceiving entities as lacking the ability to plan for the future or act 
intentionally (making the object of dehumanization seem more like an animal). Denial of 
experiential mental qualities is referred to as mechanistic dehumanization, whereby beings 
are considered to be cold and emotionless, like robots (Haslam, 2006; Morera, Quiles, 
Correa, Delgado, & Levens, 2018). Animalistically dehumanized beings are perceived as 
having reduced agency and therefore are often judged as less responsible for their actions 
(Boudjemadi, Demoulin, & Bastart, 2017). In contrast, mechanistically dehumanized beings 
are perceived as having a reduced capacity for suffering; subsequently, people view these 
individuals as having less moral value and judge harms to them as less serious (Haslam, 
2006; Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). For example, viewing professional athletes as 
“well-tuned machines” causes people to be less concerned about injuries to players because 
they may believe that the athletes are less sensitive to pain (Gray & Wegner, 2011).  
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Broadly, dehumanization can occur in many different ways. Others who are thought 
of as being low in warmth (i.e., friendliness) and competence (e.g., addicts or the homeless) 
are often dehumanized as well (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Morally outrageous crimes may 
prompt dehumanization, possibly as a means of legitimizing harsher prison sentences 
(Bastian et al., 2013). Monroe and Plant (2019) showed that people who disapprove of sexual 
outgroups (i.e., gay and transgender individuals) judge members of those groups to be less 
rational, leading to prejudice and discrimination (i.e., supporting policies that are harmful to 
members of those groups). Similarly, refugees seeking asylum in other countries can be 
dehumanized as a result of xenophobia, leading to poor treatment and living conditions 
(Varvin, 2017). In its worst iteration, dehumanization can also be a driver for genocide. 
Hutus in the Rwandan genocide referred to Tutsis as “roaches,” and Nazis during the 
Holocaust called Jews “rats” and “Untermenschen” (i.e., “subhuman”; Conan, 2011). A 
noteworthy mechanism of the Nazi’s dehumanization of the Jews was the removal of Jewish 
prisoners’ names upon entering Auschwitz, where prisoners who would be forced into hard 
labor were given tattooed serial numbers for identification instead (United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum). 
Dehumanization in the Context of Animal Welfare 
Whereas dehumanization has most often been studied in the context of judgments 
about the mindedness of other humans, it also features prominently in how people think 
about the minds of animals—particularly food animals. A common thread underlying 
differential attitudes towards and treatment of various types of animals is the idea that some 
are appropriate for food while others are not. The meat paradox refers to the idea that people 
like to eat meat but do not want to cause animals harm (Loughnan et al., 2010). This conflict 
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typically results in a denial of mental characteristics to food animals, thereby reducing one’s 
obligation to feel concern for them and alleviating discomfort. In line with this claim, 
Bratanova, Loughnan, and Bastian (2011) found that categorizing animals as food can lead to 
a decrease in perceptions of their ability to suffer, corresponding with a subsequent decrease 
in concern for their wellbeing. Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke (2012) offered a more 
pointed demonstration of this effect by showing that participants reduce their ratings of the 
mental life of cows when they believe that they will soon be eating beef. In this experiment, 
participants read a vignette about a cow grazing in a field and then gave ratings of its mental 
characteristics (e.g., capacity for thought, pain, etc.). Next, participants were told that they 
would be given something to eat later in the experiment: in one condition they would eat 
fruit, while in the other they would eat a burger. Afterwards participants were asked to again 
rate the mental characteristics of the cow. People in the fruit condition showed no significant 
change, while people in the burger condition reduced their ratings of the cow’s mental 
capacities (Bastian et al., 2012).  
Together these studies demonstrate that when animal suffering or slaughter is made 
salient, people often change their perceptions of the animals’ mental characteristics, possibly 
as a means of reducing feelings of guilt (Loughnan et al., 2010). This effect is so pervasive 
that it influences perceptions of food animals even when eating meat and food production are 
not made salient. In the U.S. people attribute fewer and less complex capacities to food 
animals (e.g., cows, sheep) than to animals not considered appropriate for eating (e.g., 
horses, dogs). Not surprisingly, it follows that food animals are judged as less deserving of 
moral consideration (Bastian et al., 2012).  
Naming’s Impact on Mindedness and Moral Value 
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Past research and historical events demonstrate that taking away a person’s name can 
be a powerful method for increasing dehumanization and enabling harmful behaviors aimed 
at that person or group (e.g., Nazis assigning Jews identification numbers during the 
Holocaust; Milgram, 1963). However, no research to date has examined whether giving an 
entity a name can increase its perceived mindedness and moral value. Several pieces of 
anecdotal evidence suggest that granting names to entities may affect perceptions of their 
moral status. For example, Amish dairy farmer Randy James explained the effect that naming 
has on the way that cows are treated (Brock, 2015): 
James states that “assigning an individual name” to the cows “somehow also 
gives an animal moral authority and provides a powerful deterrent to wanton 
cruelty—a deterrence that is absent on enormous dairy farms with thousands 
of completely anonymous, sequentially numbered animal units.” (p. 213) 
Prominent primatologist Jane Goodall echoed this sentiment in an interview 
preceding the release of the 2014 film Bears, saying that naming the animals in the movie 
“adds that they do all have different personalities,” emphasizing the importance of thinking 
of them in this way in order to enhance people’s compassion towards them (Rothman, 2014). 
Conversely, McCormick (2010) found that societies with high infant mortality tend to delay 
formally naming infants. One explanation for this pattern of behavior is that withholding a 
name from a baby during its first year of life (when mortality concerns are most pronounced) 
helps to reduce the trauma associated with losing the child. However, once the baby survives 
her first year, the likelihood that it will survive to adulthood improves; subsequently, the 
baby is named and achieves full “personhood” (McCormick, 2010).  
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Other evidence also sheds light on how naming might be related to perceptions of 
mindedness and moral value. Developmental research shows that children who read picture 
books that anthropomorphize animals are more likely to then describe real animals in human-
like ways (Ganea, Canfield, Simons-Ghafari, & Chou, 2014). Furthermore, 24-month-olds 
show a preference for stuffed animals introduced with a proper noun (e.g. “This is ZAV”) as 
opposed to stuffed animals introduced with a count noun (e.g., “This is a ZAV”), suggesting 
that personal names increase liking (Hall, Lee, and Bélanger, 2001).  
Taken together, the anecdotal and (limited) empirical evidence suggest a possible 
connection between naming, mindedness, and moral value. However, no study to date has 
directly examined this possibility. Given this information, the present study will test whether 
naming non-human entities works as a method of enhancing mind perception and increasing 
moral value. 
Present Study 
 In this experiment, participants interacted with a pill bug and were subsequently told 
that the bug would be exterminated. Participants then had an opportunity to sacrifice real 
money to save the bug. Critically, the study manipulated whether the pill bugs were named or 
unnamed. I had three hypotheses for this project. First, I hypothesized that participants who 
interacted with a named bug would perceive it as more experientially minded (i.e., more 
capable of experience) than participants who interacted with an unnamed bug. I chose to 
focus specifically on experience over agency for this prediction because of the positive 
relationship between experience and moral value cited by Gray et al. (2007) and Bastian et 
al. (2012). Specifically, their data suggest that perceiving entities as having experiencing 
minds is closely tied to attributing moral rights to them and being averse to causing them 
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(unjustified) harm. Building on this relationship, my second hypothesis was that participants 
in the named bug condition would also be willing to pay more money to save the bug than 
participants in the unnamed condition. Finally, my third hypothesis predicts that perceived 
experiential mindedness will mediate the relationship between the naming condition and the 
amount of money participants give up to save the bug’s life. 
Method 
Participants 
An a-priori power analysis (G*Power, two-tailed independent samples t-test, assumed 
effect size d = .40) showed a required sample size of 200 participants (100 per condition) to 
achieve .80 statistical power. We were able to recruit a total of 178 students from 
Appalachian State University who participated for ELC credit and the opportunity to earn up 
to $4.00. Of those, we excluded 17 participants from the mindedness analyses because they 
either did not touch the bug during the naturalist task (n = 11) or named the bug in the 
unnamed condition (n = 6). This left a total of 161 participants for the mindedness analyses. 
This sample was college-aged (M = 19.3, SD = 2.17), and primarily female (73.9%) and 
white (71.4%). Participants identified as politically moderate (M = 3.45, SD = 1.50), on a 1 
(Very liberal) – 7 (Very conservative) scale and as moderately religious (M = 2.91, SD = 
1.29), on a 1 (Not at all religious) – 5 (Very religious) scale.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested one at a time in the lab space. Upon entering the lab, 
participants first completed an informed consent form. Next, they were seated at a desk, and 
the experimenter let them know that in addition to receiving course credit they would also be 
receiving $4.00 for their participation. The $4.00 was located on the desk in the form of 16 
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quarters, stacked in four, one-dollar increments. The researcher then explained that the 
experiment was about “experience,” and presented the participant with a Dixie cup 
containing a pill bug. In the named condition the bug was introduced as “Ellie,” and in the 
unnamed condition it was introduced simply as “the bug.” The experimenter explained that 
the bug was clean and completely safe to handle, demonstrating by picking the bug up. The 
experimenter then returned the bug to the cup and invited the participant to freely interact 
with the bug for 2 minutes. Specifically, the researcher gave the participant the following 
instructions: 
OK, we’re going to start with a simple task called the naturalist task. You’re 
going to meet [Ellie/a pill bug]. [Ellie is a pill bug; she/The bug] is completely 
harmless and safe to handle. In this part of the experiment we’re going to ask 
you to observe and interact with [Ellie/the bug]. You’re going to spend the 
next 2 minutes interacting with [Ellie/the bug]. Feel free to pick [her/it] up and 
let [her/it] crawl around on your hands or on the table. Try to observe how 
[she/it] moves, and see if [she/it] rolls into [her/its] defensive posture. 
After this task, participants completed the mind perception questionnaire at a different 
desk. The questionnaire (Appendix A) measured two separate aspects of mindedness: 
experience (i.e., awareness of surroundings, capacity for emotions) and agency (i.e., ability to 
plan for the future, make decisions). The experience subscale was measured using seven 
questions (e.g., Do you think [Ellie/the bug] can feel fear? Do you think [Ellie/the bug] can 
feel pleasure?) adapted from Wegner, et al. (2007) using a 1 (Definitely no) – 7 (Definitely 
yes) Likert scale. Responses to the seven experience items showed acceptable internal 
reliability (α=.66) and were averaged to create a single “experience” index for each 
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participant. Similarly, the agency subscale included seven questions (e.g., Do you think 
[Ellie/the bug] has the capacity for planning?) using the same on the same 1 (Definitely no) 
– 7 (Definitely yes) Likert scale. These items also demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistence (α=.78) and were averaged into a single “agency” index. Finally, participants 
rated how similar they felt to the bug on a 1 (Not at all similar) – 7 (Very similar) response 
scale. All participants who recorded a response greater than 1 were shown an additional, 
open-ended prompt asking them to elaborate on why they felt similar to the bug.  
While the participant completed the mind perception questionnaire, the researcher 
prepared the materials for the next task, including the “extermination machine” (a modified 
coffee grinder with an added tube “for inserting pill bugs”), a coffee bean, and a slip of 
paper. When the participant completed the questionnaires, the researcher asked them to 
return to the first desk to begin the Extermination task. This task was framed in terms of 
investigating exterminators’ experiences with exterminating bugs. The researcher introduced 
the extermination machine and explained that it would be used to exterminate the bug; 
however, if the participant wanted to intervene to save the bug, they could do so by betting 
some of the $4.00 they were given at the beginning of the experiment. Specifically, the 
researcher read the following script to explain the scenario:  
In this part of the experiment, we’re going to drop [Ellie/the bug] into the 
device and exterminate [her/it]. However, you can attempt to save [Ellie/the 
bug] by spending some of your money. On this slip of paper I have an amount 
of money written down. You can save [Ellie/the bug] by betting some of your 
$4.00. If your bet is more than the amount I have written on this slip of paper, 
[Ellie/the bug] will be saved. We will keep any money that you bet, and you 
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will keep whatever money you hold onto. Let me know how much (if 
anything) you want to bet. Take as long as you need to decide. 
This bug-killing paradigm has been used in previous studies to establish a provocative 
and real-stakes scenario to investigate behavior (e.g., Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013; 
Martens, Kosloff, & Jackson, 2010; Martens, Kosloff, Greenberg, Landau, & Schmader, 
2007; Webber, Schimel, Martens, Haynes, & Faucher, 2013). After hearing this explanation, 
the participant made their offer, and the researcher collected the money and recorded the 
amount on the participant tracking sheet.1  
The researcher would then explain that before the results of the extermination task 
were revealed, there was another series of surveys to be completed back at the other 
computer. This next group of surveys began with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; 
Davis, 1980; Appendix B), a measure of individual differences in empathy. The IRI contains 
28 items measured on an A (Does not describe me well) – E (Describes me very well) scale. 
Second, participants completed the Varieties of Sadistic Tendencies (VAST; Paulhus & 
Jones, 2015; Appendix C), a measure of individual differences in sadistic behaviors. The 
VAST contains 16 items measured on a 1 (Strongly disagree) – 5 (Strongly agree) scale.  
Following these surveys participants were asked two questions about their comfort 
levels with bugs. First, “In general, how afraid of bugs are you?” (1, Extremely afraid – 7, 
Not afraid at all), then “In general, how grossed out by bugs are you” (1, Extremely grossed 
out – 7, Not grossed out at all). Finally, participants responded to a suspicion check: “Was 
there any part of the experiment that you were skeptical or suspicious about?” If participants 
	
1 No bugs were harmed during the experiment, and during the debriefing participants were reintroduced to their 
bug. 
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chose “Yes,” they were asked to elaborate about what specifically they were suspicious of in 
an open-ended, free response text box. This question let us know if a participant doubted that 
the bug was actually in danger of extermination. After completing the suspicion check 
question, participants completed a short demographic form and were debriefed. 
Results 
Effects of Naming on Perceptions of Mindedness 
My first hypothesis predicted that there would be a significant difference between the 
named and the unnamed conditions in their perceptions of the bug’s experiential mind. To 
test this, I conducted an independent samples t-test comparing the average experiential 
mindedness scores between groups. There was a significant difference in the scores for 
experiential mindedness, t(159) = 2.61, p = .01, d = 0.41. Specifically, participants in the 
named condition (M = 5.41, SD = 0.86) evaluated their bug as having significantly more 
experiential capacities than participants in the unnamed condition (M = 5.05, SD = 0.85).  
Naming’s Impact on Monetary Sacrifices 
My second hypothesis was that naming would increase the amount of money people 
would sacrifice to save the bug from extermination compared to the unnamed bug. For 
analyses including the extermination task, an additional 20 participants were excluded. 
Sixteen participants expressed skepticism or outright knowledge that the bug was not actually 
in danger. Another participant indicated that they wagered money strategically, thinking that 
there would be multiple rounds of betting. Finally, the bets for three participants were not 
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recorded on the participant tracking sheet due to experimenter error, leaving a final sample of 
141 participants for these analyses.2  
An independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference in amount of money 
offered between conditions, t(139) = 0.26, p = .80, d = 0.04.  Participants in the named 
condition (M = 1.98, SD = 1.37) gave nearly identical amounts of money to save “Ellie” as 
participants in the unnamed condition (M = 1.92, SD = 1.29).  
Finally, my third hypothesis predicted that perceptions of experiential mindedness 
would mediate the relationship between the naming manipulation and the amount of money 
that participants gave to save the bug from extermination. Despite failing to find a significant 
relationship in the direct pathway from naming to money offers, it is still possible that 
experiential mindedness is still a competitive mediator (for more on this, see Zhao, Lynch Jr., 
& Chen, 2010). To investigate this possibility, I ran a mediation analysis using 10,000 
bootstrap samples, which showed that experiential minded was not a significant mediator, Z 
= 0.48, SE = 0.06, p = .63 (see Table 1 for all individual pathways).  
Exploratory Analyses 
Impact on agentic mindedness. In addition to experiential mindedness, I also 
investigated participants’ ratings of agentic mindedness between groups. An independent 
samples t-test revealed a significant difference between naming conditions, t(159) = 3.49, p < 
.001, d = 0.55. Participants in the named condition (M = 4.01, SD = 3.86) rated their bug as 
having more agentic qualities than participants in the unnamed condition (M = 3.38, SD = 
1.15).  
	
2 Analyzing the first hypothesis using these additional exclusions yields the same pattern of results: named 
condition (M = 5.38, SD = 0.90), unnamed condition (M = 5.01, SD = 0.83), t(139) = 2.58, p = .011, d = 0.44. 
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Building on this finding, I further examined whether agentic mindedness served as a 
mediator of the relationship between naming condition and the amount of money participants 
gave to save the bug. A 10,000 bootstrap sample mediation analysis showed that agentic 
mindedness was not a significant mediator of the relationship between having a name and the 
amount of money participants donate to save the bug, Z = -1.01, SE = .07, p = .31 (see Table 
2 for direct pathways). 
Relationships with empathy and sadism. It was suspected that individual 
differences in levels of stable traits like empathy and sadistic behaviors might be predictive 
of participants’ responses throughout this study. Specifically, it may be that people who are 
dispositionally higher in empathy perceive more mindedness in non-human animals and give 
more money to keep them from harm.  Conversely, people higher in sadism may perceive 
less mindedness in animals and be less averted to exterminating them, subsequently giving 
less money to keep them from harm. 
I tested these predictions using a series of linear regression models. Examining 
empathy showed that it failed to predict ascriptions of experience, β = 0.03, t(159) = 0.28, p 
= .78;  or agency, β = 0.02, t(159) = 0.134, p = .89. However, it did significantly predict the 
amount of money offered to save the bug, β = 0.35, t(139) = 1.98, p = .05. Similarly, sadism 
did not significantly predict perceptions of experience, β = 0.07, t(159) = 0.39, p = .70; or 
agency, β = 0.04, t(159) = 0.16, p = .87; but did predict the amount of money offered to save 
the bug, β = -0.64, t(139) = -2.63, p = .01.  
Building on these findings, I tested whether individual differences in levels of 
empathy or sadism acted as moderators of the relationship between naming condition and 
money offers. Moderation was chosen because personality traits are typically assumed to be 
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relatively stable over time, and are less likely to be influenced by the experimental 
manipulations. A moderation analysis showed that neither empathy, Z = -1.00, SE = .34, p = 
.32; nor sadism, Z = .55, SE = .48, p = .58; moderated the relationship between the naming 
manipulation and the amount of money people offered to save the bug.  
Impact of perceived similarity and participants’ discomfort on mindedness and 
monetary sacrifice.  Correlations revealed significant positive relationships between 
perceived similarity to the bug and ratings of both experiential (r = .345, p < .001) and 
agentic (r = .427, p < .001) mindedness (but not money offering behavior, r = .043, p = .610; 
Table 3). To further investigate the role of perceived similarity in these analyses, an 
independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the average level of similarity between 
the named and the unnamed conditions; however, there was no significant difference 
between the naming conditions for ratings of similarity, t(159) = 1.68, p = .094, d = 0.265.  
Lastly, I tested whether participants’ level of discomfort (i.e., average measure of fear 
and disgust towards bugs in general) might influence perceptions of mindedness and the 
amount of money participants offer to save their bug; however, discomfort did not 
significantly correlate with perceived experience (r = .051, p = .545), agency (r = .013, p = 
.882) or donating behavior (r = .011, p = .893). 
General Discussion 
 This study’s main objective was to examine whether having a name influences 
perceptions of mindedness and moral value for non-humans. To this end, I investigated three 
primary hypotheses: (1) that having a name would increase perceptions of experiential 
mindedness, (2) that having a name would increase participants’ willingness to spend real 
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money to save a bug from extermination, and (3) that experiential mindedness would mediate 
the relationship between having a name and the amount of money participants bet.  
Results demonstrated support for my first hypothesis. Participants in the named bug 
condition rated their bug as being higher in experiential mindedness than participants in the 
unnamed condition. Moreover, participants in the named condition also rated bugs as being 
higher in agentic mindedness. Thus, this study suggests that naming non-human entities, 
even ones that differ dramatically from humans, makes people more willing to view them as 
having more human-like mental qualities such as agency, planning, and the capacity for 
emotions. 
 Despite finding support for the first hypothesis, my other two hypotheses were not 
supported. Naming the bug did not cause participants to give more money to save its life; nor 
did perceived mindedness mediate the relationship between the naming manipulation and 
participants’ donating behavior. This finding is not in line with the existing empirical 
evidence that shows that increases in experiential mindedness are associated with increased 
ascriptions of moral value (e.g., Gray et al., 2007). The present study is the first to place 
participants in a scenario where they are faced with forfeiting real money in order to 
(presumably) save real life. These results suggest that moving from hypothetical scenarios to 
real world situations may diminish or eliminate the relationship between experiential 
mindedness and moral value. Although any null effect should be interpreted with caution, 
this finding opens the door to further inquiry into the kinds of situations and the degrees of 
realism that influence participants’ willingness to take action on behalf of other beings. For 
example, it could be the case that giving participants more money or making them feel more 
attached to the money (e.g., making them earn it throughout the experiment) might have a 
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different effect on participants’ thoughts about offering money to save the bug. Similarly, 
using a different kind of animal (e.g., not an insect) or different stakes (e.g., reward vs. 
punishment instead of life vs. death) might also change peoples’ attitudes. 
 The exploratory analyses also uncovered several noteworthy results. First, the naming 
manipulation affected attributions of agentic mindedness nearly identically to what I found 
for experiential mindedness. Giving bugs a name increased people’s willingness to attribute 
the ability to feel (as predicted), but it also increased perceptions of the named bug’s agency 
(the ability to plan and from intentions). Past studies (Gray et al., 2007) argue that agency 
and experience are distinct from one another, but the present findings suggest that 
perceptions of agency and experience may be more closely related than previously thought. 
Additionally, although neither aspect of mindedness significantly affected the amount 
of money participants offered to save the bug, individual differences in empathy and sadistic 
tendencies did. In general, participants higher in empathy offered more money to save the 
bug during the extermination task, whereas participants higher in sadistic tendencies offered 
less money. However, neither personality measure was significantly correlated with either 
measure of mindedness. This connection between personality traits and the money offers 
might be explained by participants’ relative feelings of aversion to harm. Participants higher 
in empathy may be more harm-averse (thereby making higher offers to ensure the bug is not 
harmed), whereas, participants higher in sadistic tendencies may actually view causing harm 
as enjoyable and resulting in them offering less money to save the bug. One caveat to this, 
however, is that the measures of empathy and sadistic tendencies were collected after 
participants completed the extermination task and made their money offers. Thus, it is 
possible that participants’ responses on these measures were influenced by their behavior in 
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that task (e.g., participants that made relatively low offers may have then responded higher 
on the sadistic tendencies measure to justify their behavior). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Considering the results from all three hypotheses together shows that while the 
naming manipulation changed participants’ attitudes towards the bug (hypothesis 1), it was 
not enough to influence participants’ behavior (hypotheses 2 and 3). This pattern might 
suggest that the naming manipulation was effective, but not very strong, as it was sufficient 
to change people’s attitudes, but not more costly behaviors. 
Moreover, the current findings are related to a single name—“Ellie”—which could 
mean that this pattern of results may not be stable across different names. Different names 
may carry with them different assumptions of experience, agency, and even morality. A 
name’s typical gender association may result in differences in perceived experience or 
agency, as men are stereotypically viewed as more agentic whereas women are viewed as 
being more experiential (Gray, Knobe, Sheshkin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2011). Similarly, 
stereotyping ethnicity or cultural significance could influence intuitions about mindedness 
and morality. For example, stereotypical associations with certain names or cultures may 
activate different aspects of mindedness. For example, Germanic-sounding names like 
“Gunther” may elicit more agency and less experience to American participants, while a 
name like “Cutesy” might evoke little agency whatsoever. Additionally, people may be more 
willing to let harm come to a bug named “Adolf” than “Ellie” because a name like “Adolf” 
primes perceptions of immorality. Since we only tested one name, the present research is not 
able to provide definitive answers on these questions, and future research is needed to 
investigate the extent to which different names can produce different perceptions. 
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Additionally, there are potential alternative explanations for this result related to the 
experimental design. First, it is possible that many participants may not have understood the 
nature of the extermination task and their bets to save the bug. Some participants seemed 
very upset at the idea of killing the bug when the extermination machine was introduced, but 
then made relatively low offers when asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 
the bug. This suggests that participants may not have fully understood how their offers would 
influence whether or not the bug was exterminated. A related potential confound was 
expressed by some other participants, who expected to encounter another bug and another 
betting scenario later in the experiment, and so made their bets strategically to save money 
for later trials. Future research using a similar paradigm could investigate this possibility 
further by including a measure of the extent to which participants believe they offered 
enough (or not) to save the bug from extermination (e.g., “Do you think you offered enough 
to save the bug?” or “What do you think is the likelihood that your bet was enough to save 
the bug?”). 
 It is also possible that the $4.00 payment to participants was not enough to elicit a 
real feeling of stakes or of having “skin in the game.” If participants did not feel like they 
really had something of value at risk, then it is possible that they did not feel particularly 
strongly about their bets to save the bug (which could explain why bets in both conditions 
converged at around $2.00—half of the total possible amount). Future studies should 
consider potentially using a greater amount of money or adding some manipulation to make 
participants feel more attached to the money (e.g., ask participants to envision ways that they 
could spend the money after the experiment) to enhance participants’ feelings of ownership 
and involvement. 
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 Finally, despite these possibilities relating to payment and participants offering 
money, it is worth noting that the construct validity of money offers as a measure of 
participants’ moral valuation of the bug is unknown. While money offers to save the bug 
from harm seem to have face validity, this measure has not been used in previous research. It 
could be the case that the amount of money a participant is willing to give up in order to save 
the bug is not reflective of their attribution of moral value to the bug. For example, it could 
instead be measuring some variable relating to participants’ socioeconomic status. It is 
possible that two participants could view the bug with the same level of mindedness and 
moral value but have different ideas about how valuable $4.00 is. In this case, participants 
that perceive the same amount of mindedness and moral value might make different offers, 
reflecting their different valuations of what $4.00 is worth. Researchers investigating these 
relationships in the future should consider including both a monetary measure and a more 
traditional measure of moral value (e.g., questionnaire items relating to the wrongness of 
harming the bug) to determine how well money offers represent moral valuations. 
Conclusion 
 The relationship between having a name and perceptions of mindedness has been 
recounted anecdotally but had not been empirically supported until now. By demonstrating 
that having a name does enhance perceptions of mindedness in pill bugs, this project lays the 
foundation for future investigations into relationship between naming and mindedness. 
Additionally, the lack of support for my second hypothesis about increases in money 
amounts raises questions about the connection between perceptions of mindedness and 
perceptions of moral value that should be investigated in more detail in the future. To this 
end, these findings also suggest that stable personality traits like empathy and sadistic 
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tendencies may be more relevant predictors of behavior than perceptions of mindedness. 
Ultimately, this project opens the door to further investigations of this relationship and poses 
important conceptual questions about whether and how having a name relates to perceptions 
of mindedness, and what that relationship might mean in terms of real-world applications. 
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Table 1 
 
Experiential Mindedness as a Mediator of Naming and Money Amount 
Effect Estimate SE Z p 
Indirect 0.0266 0.0555 0.479 0.632 
Direct -0.0849 0.2199 -0.386 0.700 
Total -0.0583 0.2231 -0.261 0.794 
 
Path Estimates 
 Estimate SE Z p 
Condition à 
Experience 
-0.3757 0.153 -2.458 0.014 
Experience à Amount -0.0708 0.135 -0.526 0.599 
Condition à Amount -0.0849 0.220 -0.386 0.700 
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Table 2 
 
Agentic Mindedness as a Mediator of Naming and Money Amount 
Effect Estimate SE Z p 
Indirect -0.0708 0.0699 -1.0129 0.311 
Direct 0.0125 0.2342 0.0534 0.957 
Total -0.0583 0.2266 -0.2572 0.797 
 
Path Estimates 
 Estimate SE Z p 
Condition à Agency -0.6318 0.1915 -3.2989 <.001 
Agency à Amount 0.1120 0.0975 1.1495 0.250 
Condition à Amount 0.0125 0.2342 0.0534 0.957 
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* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p  < .001 
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Appendix A 
MINDEDNESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Answer Scale: 
Definitely no | o o o o o o o | Definitely yes 
1. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can feel fear?  
2. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can feel pleasure? 
3. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can feel pain? 
4. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can feel rage? 
5. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for self-control? 
6. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for morality? 
7. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for memory? 
8. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can recognize others’ emotions? 
9. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for planning? 
10. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can feel joy? 
11. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] can feel happiness? 
12. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for desiring? 
13. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for wishing? 
14. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for thinking? 
15. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for tasting? 
16. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for seeing? 
17. Do you think [Ellie / the bug] has the capacity for hearing? 
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Appendix B 
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations.  
For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the 
scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you have decided on your answer, fill in 
the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY 
BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
 
A               B               C               D               E 
     DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
DESCRIBE ME                                              VERY 
WELL                                                             WELL 
 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
(FS) 
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (EC) (-
) 
 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
(EC) 
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. (PD) 
 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
      perspective. (PT) 
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12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. (FS) (-) 
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
      arguments. (PT) (-) 
 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS) 
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them.  
      (EC) (-) 
 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
       character. (FS) 
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. (PT) 
 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 
 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
 
 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
  PD = personal distress scale 
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  A = 0 
  B = 1 
  C = 2 
  D = 3 
  E = 4 
 
Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored: 
 
  A = 4 
  B = 3 
  C = 2 
  D = 1 
  E = 0 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. 
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85. 
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Appendix C 
Varieties of Sadistic Tendencies (VAST) 
(Paulhus & Jones, 2015) 
Please rate your agreement or disagreement on 5-point scales anchored by (1) strongly 
disagree and (5) strongly agree.  
1. In video games, I like the realistic blood spurts. 
2. I sometimes replay my favorite scenes from gory slasher films. 
3. I enjoy watching cage fighting (or MMA), where there is no escape. 
4. I sometimes look away in horror movies. (R)  
5. In car-racing, it’s the accidents that I enjoy most. 
6. There’s way too much violence in sports. (R) 
7. I love the YouTube clips of people fighting.  
8. I enjoy physically hurting people. 
9. I would never purposely humiliate someone. (R) 
10. I was purposely cruel to someone in high school. 
11. I enjoy hurting my partner during sex (or pretending to). 
12. I can dominate others using fear. 
13. I enjoy making people suffer.  
14. I enjoy mocking losers to their face.  
15. I never said mean things to my parents. (R)  
16. I enjoy tormenting animals – especially the nasty ones. 
Fillers can be intermixed to offset the glut of negativity.   
I’m considered to be a kind person. 
By staying strong, one can better help others.  
I’d do anything – even break the law – for those I love. 
I go out of my way to help family members. 
I have ambitions to make the world a better place. 
My goal is to be a missionary and help others. 
I give money to poor people on the street. 
I’m worried that we have already seriously damaged the Earth. 
I want to spend my life helping sick children. 
I have had some really good friends. 
I am a religious person. 
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Scoring and Norms for the VAST subscales 
Vicarious sadism = mean of items 1-7; Direct sadism = mean of items 8-16.     
 
Norms are derived from a sample of 301 participants on Mechanical Turk. 
 Men   Women  α Gender Difference 
Effect Size 
 M SD  M SD  d 
Direct 
Sadism 
1.95 0.72  1.36 0.56 .84 0.93 
Vicarious 
Sadism 
2.90 0.80  2.34 0.68 .79 0.75 
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